Hilgartner. (1990) The dominant view of popularization: Conceptual problems, political uses

The culturally-dominant view of the popularization of science is rooted in the idealized notion of pure, genuine scientific knowledge against which popularized knowledge is contrasted. A two-stage model is assumed: first, scientists develop genuine scientific knowledge; subsequently, popularizers disseminate simplified accounts to the public. Moreover, the dominant view holds that any differences between genuine and popularized science must be caused by 'distortion' or 'degradation' of the original truths. (p. 519)

Unfortunately, the distinction between “scientific accounts” and “popularizations” or “distorted accounts” is a false binary. Hilgartner deconstructs three ways of drawing the distinction:

The context in which knowledge is presented.

• Criterion: Communications between scientists using scientific forums are scientific accounts. All others are popularization.
• Difficulty: Raises questions about which experts, audiences an forums are “scientific.” There are many gradations and types of expertise, many professional roles that scientist fill, and many methods that scientists use to communicate. The diversity within these categories invites problems distinguishing between experts and laypersons, scientific media and popular ones.

Content of the message.

• Criterion: Scientific accounts employ specialized scientific language and a high degree of precision. Popularizations are more fast and loose.
• Difficulty: The precision with which claims are stated is a matter of degree. Attempts to draw a line beyond which accounts are unscientific invites trouble.

Originality of knowledge.

• Criterion: Only reports of new scientific facts constitute scientific accounts. Other “downstream representations” of knowledge are popularization.
• Difficulty: Even within the scientific community, experiments and concepts must be tested repeatedly and argued out to be agreed upon as scientific facts. Thus, any attempt to distinguish a point at which this happens is problematic. Even within a single scientific paper, a fact may be stated, then rephrased, reframed, and summarized differently at different points.

Since what constitutes a genuine scientific account, an appropriate popularization, or a “distortion” of scientific knowledge is clearly subjective, it pays to ask under what conditions these labels are applied, and by whom. Turns out scientists do most of the application, and they apply the labels when it suits their interests. Thus, Hilgartner suggests scientists use them to secure and maintain prestige and authority. This is all about power, says Hilgartner, and it pays to examine it as such:

Experts are granted broad discretion about what aspects of a subject to simplify, how much to simplify, what language and metaphors to use in simplified accounts, and what criteria to use when matching their presentations to their audiences. Obviously, it would be naïve to assume that their simplified representations are politically neutral. On the contrary, a mountain of evidence shows that experts often simplify science with an eye toward persuading their audience to support their goals: whether they seek to motivate people to follow public health recommendations, build support for research programmes, convince investors that a finding shows commercial promise, or advocate positions in science-intensive policy controversies. (p. 531)

[T]he dominant view shores up the epistemic hierarchy which ranks scientists above such actors as policymakers, journalists, technical practitioners. historians and sociologists of science, and the public. Because scientific experts are entitled to draw and redraw the boundary between 'appropriate simplification' and 'distortion', non-experts remain forever vulnerable to having their understandings and representations of science derided as 'popularized', and 'distorted' - even if they accurately repeat statements made to them by scientists. (pp. 533-534)