Public Experiments and Displays of Virtuosity (Collins, 1988)

Collins, H. M. (1988). Public experiments and displays of virtuosity. Social Studies of Science, 18(4), 725-748. (Reviewed by Laura)

• “Public experiments” are defined by Collins as “tests performed before the lay public in an attempt to show them that one state of natural affairs exists rather than another” (p. 725). Collins notes that they are paradoxical in two ways:
1. They are thought to provide certainty by allowing the public to witness SCIENCE firsthand; however, work in SSK suggests that close proximity to the creation of scientific knowledge yields uncertainty. In fact, distance from a scientific controversy is one of the only factors shown to lead to certainty.
2. The public is expected to come to a single, “firm conclusion” by watching these experiments; however, these experiments usually produce disagreement among the “experts.”

• Collins notes that experiments are different than demonstrations. Experiments are performed in private spaces, and involve material that the scientist is not yet confident enough to share with the public. Demonstrations, on the other hand, can be thought of as “epiditic displays of virtuosity” (727) and as “entertainment.” Demonstrations are the science with the kinks worked out, and are thus acceptable for general “public consumption.” In sum:
1. Experiments are designed by a scientist to “find out something about the natural world,” often in the midst of a scientific controversy. Think: private laboratories, professional scientists. (Roughly speaking: creation of science.)
2. Demonstrations are designed to convince and/or educate a public audience, not to conclude a scientific controversy. Think: classrooms and museums. (Roughly speaking: dissemination of science.)

• Back in Boyle and even in Farraday’s times, “witnessing” meant being temporally and spatially present with the scientist. Since the advent of the TV, “witnessing” science has changed dramatically; as Collins notes, “Now, when we talk of audiences, we must bear in mind that the majority of the witnesses are at two removes. Not only are they distanced from the creation of knowledge, they are distanced from its demonstration” (730).

• Collins presents two cases studies of “public experiments” that occured in 1984: the British Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB)’s demonstration of nuclear fuel storage flasks in a railroad car collision and American Federal Aviation Authority (FAA)’s demonstration of anti-misting kerosene (AMK) jet fuel in a staged plane crash. Each was arranged to “prove” the safety of a particular process/product to the general public.

• Although both tests had “apparently clear and convincing outcomes” (732), Collins shows that the results could be re-interpreted from alternative vantage points, thus making the “certain” outcome not as straightforward—neither to “experts” nor to the general public. In respect to the two cases, Collins concludes:
1. “The CGED successfully demonstrated the post-closure claim that they could make strong flasks but, not without encouragement, the public read this as a proof of the much wider pre-closure claim that flasks are safe” (739).
2. “The intended demonstration [of the AMK] turned into…an experiment concerning the behavior of AMK under the most extreme of circumstances—an experiment from which they could learn, but one that they would have preferred to have done in private” (739).

• Collins thus concludes that the case studies provide evidence of “distorted interpretive license” (740). He argues that the boundaries of the “core-set”—that is, the group of technical experts participating in the resolution of a scientific controversy—were over-extended in these cases to include the general public; hence, “the public were treated as though they were capable of assessing and interpreting experiments bearing on unsettled issues—respectively, the safety of nuclear flasks and the safety of AMK under extreme and unusual crash conditions” (741).

• In the end, Collins isn’t arguing for making the resolution of scientific controversy just the realm of the “experts” (whoever that actually is) but he does think that the public needs to be more informed about the multiple points of view involved, and the overall process of “how scientific knowledge is made” (743). To me, this sounds like a rallying cry for “public understanding of science and technology studies.”

• My critique: I find Collins’ portrayal of the “over-extended core-set” appealing, but I think that his resolution of this issue is rather weak. How can we avoid another situation like those described in his cases studies? How would PUS&TS be defined, let alone “increased,” if achieving and measuring PUS is already so problematic to begin with? I also take issue with the author’s black and white portrayal of “experts” vs. “the public.” Clearly, there would be those interested and uninterested and probably many nuanced layers in between; also, this work deliberately shies away from problematizing who/what an “expert” is, and whether lay persons can be considered experts of another “ilk.” (Interestingly, Collins actually does address these issues in later work, such as his 2002 typology of expertise with Evans.)